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DÁNIEL DEÁK*
Taxation of the Financial Sector: 
Regulatory and Justifi cation Issues 
Abstract. The so-called bank levy–a tax levied on bank leverage–has been proliferated to date. They are the 
product of reacting to the global fi nancial crisis that started in the autumn of 2008. Therefore, they can only be 
understood in the context of the crisis. Since one or two decades, the fi nancial industry has produced much 
innovation that is to be refl ected in taxation. The application of bank levy is thus the result of the reforms initiated 
in the sphere of fi nancial regulation rather than tax law. Financial and tax laws are different from each other in 
many respects, however, as it will be discussed below where the constitutional background for the introduction of 
fi nancial taxes will be explored. In this paper, bank levies; one of the newly introduced fi nancial taxes–are in the 
centre of interest. In this respect, the paper concerns detailed policy matters and justifi cation issues.
Keywords: bank leverage taxation, excessive fi nance, tax incidence 
1. Regulatory policy issues in detail 
A bank leverage tax is a levy that is designed to infl uence how much fi nancial enterprises 
should be leveraged. The idea of introducing such a tax is to deter banks from getting 
engaged in excessive fi nancial activities.1 From the viewpoint of legal regulation, it is 
therefore a key issue of how to identify excessive fi nancing. This question will be discussed 
later. Before, it is important to get familiar with the functions this tax is expected to fulfi l in 
the regulation of the conduct of the participants of the fi nancial market. 
(i) Tax and non-tax tools of regulation, steering duties 
In general, the functions of taxation are: 
– to raise funds for public purposes; 
– to contribute to economic stabilisation; and 
– to administer distributive justice. 
With a bank levy, the function of economic stabilisation can be highlighted. 
While special fi nancial taxes can be considered as tax related regulatory tools, they can 
also be seen in parallel to non-tax regulatory tools (in German-speaking literature: 
“ordnungsrechtliche Maßnahmen”).2 The bank levy as a tax related regulatory tool can be 
compared to the Basle standards as non-tax regulatory tools. Taxes operate as the means of 
social control in all times, even if this function is usually secondary to the function of 
* Professor of Law, Corvinus University of Budapest, H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8. 
E-mail: daniel.deak@uni-corvinus.hu
1 More broadly, a bank leverage tax is a Pigovian one, the function of which is to alter prices, so 
as to better align private decision-making with wider economic and social considerations. See: Keen, 
M.: The taxation and regulation of fi nancial institutions, Colloquium on tax policy and public fi nance. 
New York, 2011. 10. 
2 Bergfeld, K.: Lenkungsabgaben im europäischen Finanzrecht. Baden-Baden, 2008. 17–18, 25, 
27, 30. 
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raising money. In comparison to taxes, there are other types of social control as well. The 
latter are designed directly to infl uence the social conduct under certain circumstances. A 
bank levy can be characterised by referring to a combination of the functions of fund-
raising and social control. More precisely, in case of bank levies, the function of fund-
raising is superseded by that of social control. With normal taxes, this is inversely, i.e. the 
function of social control is subordinated to that of fund-raising. As, in case of a bank levy, 
the function of social control takes precedence to that of collecting money, it constitutes an 
example for charges that can be considered as para fi scal charges or steering duties (in 
German-speaking literature: “Lenkungsabgaben”). The effective German bank levy 
(Bankenabgabe) is a good example for this. 
Steering duties as mentioned here, and corrective taxes that have been discussed above 
are the same phenomena. They all are para fi scal charges, meaning that their function is not 
just to raise funds, but also to seek to infl uence the taxpayer’s behaviour, and to orient them 
in a way a regulatory power considers desirable for macroeconomic purposes. In case of 
corrective taxes, it is highlighted that they are adjusted to the estimated macroeconomic 
harm to be eliminated by way of taxes. In case of steering duties, a particular type of social 
control is singled out. Hence, the former term focuses on the function, the latter one on the 
structure of the tax related tools of legal regulation. 
Tax and non-tax tools of social control must be examined on a comparative basis. The 
instances of comparison can be highlighted as follows:3 
– Incidence–i.e. who bears the real incidence of regulation and taxes in the fi nancial 
sector? 
– Perimeter–i.e. the set of fi rms to be taxed or regulated needs to be defi ned when 
designing the scope of taxes or prudential rules. 
– Calibration–i.e. determining the appropriate corrective actions requires understanding 
how the fi nancial sector will respond to policy, and deciding how large the relevant 
externalities are. 
A bank levy can be characterised by three features: 
– They fulfi l the function of exercising infl uence on the social conduct. 
– They are established on a link existing between the liability to pay and the receipt of 
public services. They can be considered in this respect to “Kausalabgaben”, i.e. to public 
charges that are compensated by the provision of public services. In case of a bank levy, it 
can still be problematic to interpret this link between the liability to pay for the public and 
the receipt of public services. Truly, it is in the public interest–and in the best interests of 
fi nancial service-providers–to identify and isolate systemic risks. The money collected from 
bank levies is still not spent directly and exclusively on banks. In this respect, it is diffi cult 
to justify such a levy as a sort of “Kausalabgaben”. 
– The constitutional basis for introducing bank levies is not necessarily independent. 
National public authorities usually need special authority to levy steering duties. This may 
also be a problem for the introduction of FTT at a European level, the revenue of which 
should be collected to go to the own EU sources. In order to reach this goal, it is necessary, 
however, to authorise the EU to introduce a new category of own resources in accordance 
with Article 311 TFEU.4 
3 A fair and substantial contribution by the fi nancial sector, IMF fi nal report for the G-20, June 
2010. 52. 
4 COM(2011) 510 fi nal. 
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Refl exivity can be realised not only in fi nancial innovations (where the pricing of 
fundamental goods can be dramatically affected by the movements of the fi nancial market), 
but law related social organisation can also be fi lled by refl exivity. Refl exive law does not 
rely on either formal, or substantive rationality. Instead, social control to be negotiated by 
this type of law is based on self-regulation, and on the recursively determined forms of 
social cooperation that can be developed on a micro-scale. For instance, communities of 
consumers can organise themselves to achieve their effective protection at a suffi cient level. 
This is to complement statutory law regulation that concerns the major mechanism of the 
offi cial society. Such micro-scale communities can be organised, based on bargaining, 
participatory democracy and consistency of the values that are developed through a process 
of discourse. In the tax law area, contracting out makes an alternative to the standard 
vertical relationship of taxpayers and the tax authorities. This makes it possible–for 
example, for the so-called qualifi ed fi nancial intermediaries that can act as authorised 
economic operators before the public authorities by way of contracting–to enforce the tax 
law rights and obligations in a horizontal way. 
The law of such contracts is different from normal statutory law. It can only be 
interpreted as the product of refl exive law. This is to replace, or rather complement, both the 
perfection of individualism in line with conceptually constructed rules to be applied through 
deductive logic, and the collective regulation of economic and social activity through the 
purposive programmes of action to be implemented via regulations. The basic functions of 
refl exive law are self-reproduction and constant communication with the environment of 
the system of refl exive law through internal discourse and external coordination, 
respectively. Refl exive law is helpful with the management of social confl icts by making 
non-legal problems legal, while law as a system will also be infl uenced by its non-legal 
environment and abandons using categorical and comprehensive forms of statutory law. 
The key to functioning of refl exive law is procedural orientation where institutional 
structures and decision processes are relationally oriented.5 That is, parties are willing to 
seek to reformulate their mutual expectations that can fi ll the room for actions in concert 
from case to case. 
It is not only in the economic life that goods are valued, depending on how much they 
can be shared with those to whom they are provided. It is also true in the sphere of public 
administration that specifi c rights and obligations concerning the conduct of taxpayers and 
tax authorities will be determined in relation to each other. This is to complement statutory 
law that cannot guide parties in suffi cient details. 
The gaps of the legal infrastructure that are developed in the fi nancial sector are hoped 
to be fi lled by the refl exivity of law. Although parties may lack suffi cient legal quality, they 
may be in cooperation with each other. The result of reaching agreements can be achieved 
by self-reproduction and constant communication with the environment on a micro scale 
through internal discourse and external coordination to be conducted among the market 
players. For example, the Hungarian Banking Association and the Government were able to 
arrive at an agreement in December 2011 on the crisis taxes to be introduced abruptly in the 
banking sector, as mentioned. 
Steering duties are able to soften the harsh consequences of either normal taxes or 
non-tax regulatory tools. Although they lack a higher level of legal certainty, they can 
survive, based on the values mutually recognised from case to case. Mutual trust and 
5 Teubner, G.: Substantive and refl exive elements in modern law. Law and Society, 17 (1983) 2. 
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adjustment to be shown to each other by parties are a driving force of this type of legal 
regulation. This is a form of social control that cannot be spared because it is otherwise 
diffi cult to identify the impact of the externalities that arise from the systemic risks to be 
associated with the fi nancial operation. Bottom-up confl ict management comes fi rst in this 
respect, rather than comprehensive mandatory legislation. 
The externalities to be addressed by a bank levy cannot be identifi ed, based on 
comprehensive and unambiguous values that are determined preliminarily. In case of 
steering duties, including a bank levy, the traditional form of statutory law ends. This is 
because the externalities to be addressed cannot be approached, but by estimation. Estimates 
and rough calculation are not the same as precise and individually separable legal 
consequences, however. The question is of special interest in case of taxes–and the bank 
levy is a kind of tax–where the liability to pay should be established on legal precision. 
Under these circumstances, legal certainty cannot be fully guaranteed, or at least not in the 
traditional way. Instead, a kind of fl exibility and adjustment is necessary. The addressee of 
the levy should accept what is levied even if the conditions of levy are specifi ed subsequent 
to the taxable event only. Consensus cannot be reached in such cases, but during a process 
of discourse, in which the mutual expectations of parties–whether plainly spoken or not–
can hopefully be met. 
(ii) Identifi cation of excessive fi nancing 
The control tool of bank levy can only be effective if excessive fi nancing–that what is to be 
addressed by the levy–can be approximated. In this respect, it is crucial to distinguish 
between core and non-core liabilities of market participants. Core liabilities are the claims 
of the ultimate creditors (the household sector) on the intermediary sector, being on the 
verge of the fi nancial system, making en entry into the real economy from the fi nancial 
economy. A non-core liabilities tax is a prudential tool to dampen pro-cyclicality, making 
non-core funding more expensive.6 
The notion of excessive fi nancing can be approached, fi rst regarding the distinction 
between speculation and enterprise as introduced already by Keynes in the way as follows. 
For purposes of short-term asset trading, the fundamental value of assets, based on the risk-
adjusted present value of expected long-term cash fl ows, may matter less than what average 
opinion expects the average opinion regarding resale value to be.7 Forecasting the 
prospective yields of assets over their lifetime can thus be contrasted to the psychology of 
market. One can refer here to what was mentioned about the principles that govern the 
market of fi nancial innovation, from which the global fi nancial crisis arises. This is the 
principles of refl exivity, virtualisation and self-generation (autopoiesis). The market 
schemes of fi nancial innovation result in refl exivity in pricing, in amplifi cation of realities 
due to restructuring of claims, and in growth stimulated by self-generation without sober 
limits. It comes therefore that volatility, non-transparency and liquidity problems cannot be 
escaped what triggers systemic risks. This is what must be addressed by a steering duty like 
a bank levy. 
6 Shin, H. S.: Policy Memorandum on Non-Core Liabilities Tax as a Tool for Prudential 
Regulation (manuscript). Seoul, 19 February 2010, 7–8. 
7 Shaviro, D.: The Financial Transactions Tax Versus (?) the Financial Activities Tax. New 
York, 2012. 4; Keynes, J. M.: The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. San Diego, 
1964 ed., 158. 
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While approximating the scope of a bank leverage tax, speculation as such cannot be 
associated with externalities. Tax is rather addressed to hyper-speculation that can also be 
explained from a business ethics perspective. It is noteworthy8 that 
– even if the question cannot be answered on what scale wagering on derivatives 
should take place, the question cannot be eliminated; 
– it is common in excessive speculation on derivatives and tax planning that what is 
rational for the individual’s private economy is not rational for the economy as a whole; 
– distinction must be made between knowledge-enlarging and chance-driven wagers; 
the former constitute a value-creating component of the capitalist economy, the latter does 
not; and 
– fi nancial wagers on derivatives provide economic functionality insofar as they 
contribute to value-creation, such as hedging, market liquidity or arbitrage–excessive 
wagering on derivatives suppresses value-creating activities. 
It is possible to give positive meaning to the subject of a bank leverage tax if one 
refers not only to the increase of fi nancial stability, but also to the requirement that this tax 
should serve the fi nance of the common goods, even on a global level. The actual meaning 
of the common goods is, however, different in different circumstances, as this is only a 
framework term that must be specifi ed from case to case. 
Particular dangers of excessive fi nancing can be enhanced after the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis as follows:9 
– although securitisation is necessary, in order to benefi t from fi nancial innovation, the 
originate and distribute model is dangerous, and the claim for a fee instead of the deposit 
interest escapes the Basle standards; 
– it is dangerous that structured investment vehicles as off balance sheet entities are 
sponsored by banks, but not owned (banks become bankruptcy remote); 
– mark-to-market accounting may cause fi nancial instability; and 
– the tranching system of repackaged claims may cause opacity of risks in fi nancial 
products. 
Along with instability and opacity, the threat of excessive fi nancing on the whole 
economy can further be explained. Although this explanation is provided in the context of 
introducing a Tobin-like tax (a transaction tax), the externalities to be hit are the same in 
case of a bank leverage tax. The comments as follows require particular attention in this 
respect:10 
– fi nancial transactions have expanded several times faster than transactions in the 
“underlying” markets for goods and services; 
– trading in derivatives markets has expanded signifi cantly stronger than trading in 
spot markets; and 
– abrupt fl uctuation in prices is the result of the accumulation of short-term (intra-day) 
runs, which persist in one direction longer than the counter-movements, i.e. in a “bullish” 
8 Koslowski, P: The Ethics of Banking; Conclusions from the Financial Crisis. Dordrecht, 2011, 
Chapter 6: The Ethical Economy of the Market for Derivatives: Trading with Values Derived from 
Other Values for Hedging, Speculation, and Arbitrage, 94–95. 
9 Dam, K. W.: The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: An International Perspective. J. 
Straus, J. (ed.): The Role of Law and Ethics in the Globalized Economy. Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. 
98–101. 
10 Schulmeister, S.–Schratzenstaller, M.–Picek, O.: A General Financial Transaction Tax 
Motives. Revenues, Feasibility and Effects. WIFO, Vienna, March 2008, 1–3. 
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market; upward runs persist longer than downward runs, the opposite is true in a “bearish” 
market. 
Furthermore, according to Stephan Schulmeister,11 
– both the IMF and EC proposals (as refl ected in the respective 2010 working papers) 
are based on the false presupposition that markets tend to equilibrium, and departure from it 
is at random only; 
– the bank levies as introduced seem to be less effi cient insofar as they are targeted at 
holding, and not at trading in, assets; and 
– the impact on the economy of the trade in derivatives and other structured fi nancial 
instruments is signifi cant not only due to its huge volume, but also because of its extremely 
high speed, and because notional contracts and high leverage have been enormously 
proliferated. 
(iii) Taxation of the holding of, versus trading in, securities 
Even if both a bank levy and a Tobin-like tax are aimed at the same subject, they are clearly 
different in their methodology. The point to this is that a bank leverage tax only concerns 
holding of securities, not trading in them. However, one can argue that a bank leverage tax 
can be as much effi cient as a Tobin tax if certain conditions are met: 
– it is dedicated to a special national fund; 
– innocent assets or liabilities are excluded from taxation (low-risk assets, long-term 
deposits, etc.); and 
– there is progression in taxation. 
Further on, in case of a bank leverage tax, there is much less danger of relocation. In 
contrast to a Tobin tax, a bank leverage tax is based on the personal scope of taxation. Also, 
there is less possibility for the taxpayer to pass over the burden of tax to the client. It is the 
backside of the application of a bank leverage tax, however, that it is not able to meet a high 
standard of legal certainty and, insofar as it is normally dedicated to a special fund, it 
suggests also a challenge to the sovereignty, unity and completeness of the state budget. 
Truly, as a bank leverage tax is a special tax, it is diffi cult to fi nd a place for it in the 
legal system. In particular, it may challenge the equality principle insofar as it lays a special 
burden to fi nancial service-providers. The legitimacy problem of legal certainty can also be 
raised, although it can be managed, provided that the legislator provides a comprehensive 
and detailed specifi cation of legislative goals and determines homogeneous groups that can 
be described by their systemic relevance. In other words, if the law on a bank levy is 
specifi c enough, the equality problem can be escaped. The compatibility issue will thus not 
appear in case of a well-tailored tax law. As it can be seen from the German bank levy, it 
was the legislator’s major concern to identify the scope of tax by well-prepared legislative 
goals.12 
The bank leverage tax (“BLT”) is often compared to the options of an FTT and similar 
taxes, e.g. a securities transaction tax (“STT”). There are authors who criticise the option of 
11 Schulmeister, S.: Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Bank levy versus 
transactions tax: A critical analysis of the IMF and EC reports on fi nancial sector taxation. WIFO 
paper, Wien, 30 April 2010, 1–3. 
12 Schön, W.–Hellgardt, A.–Osterloh-Konrad, Ch.: Rechtsgutachten zur verfassungsrechtlichen 
Bewertung einer Bankenabgabe nach dem Regierungsentwurf eines Restrukturierungsgesetzes. 
München, 12. 10. 2010, 114. 
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FTT, but who are in favour of BLT. An example for this can be shown in Table 1. In this 
respect, one can argue that it is realistic to expect that the risk of both relocation and non-
relocation avoidance can be signifi cantly reduced. Also, the distorting effect of BLT could 
be below average. It is recommended to apply a wide taxable basis and rates that are below 
0.1%. Then, taxpayers would arguably not deem it necessary to look for substitute markets. 
Table 1:  Evaluation of the policy options of Bank Leverage Tax, Financial Activity Tax and 
Securities Transaction Tax13 
BLT FAT STT 
Risk reduction Potentially signifi cant Potentially signifi cant Insignifi cant 
Distortion Below average Below average Above average 
2. Double charging of bank levy 
It is a particular feature of bank leverage taxes that they are based on the personal scope of 
taxation. As discussed, this results in double charging because both the foreign branches of 
domestic fi nancial enterprises and the domestically operating branches of foreign fi nancial 
enterprises are taxable. The scope of taxation is closely connected with the choice of 
connecting factors. While introducing a bank leverage tax on the model of the IMF FSC, all 
participants of the fi nancial market may be caught by taxation that are authorised to provide 
fi nancial services within a particular jurisdiction. Another important factor of taxation–
similar to the fi rst one–is that all assets and liabilities that are included in the accounts of 
domestic resident fi nancial enterprises are taxable. The choice of the fi nancial and 
accounting law framework suggests not only worldwide taxation, but also expands the list 
of those to whom tax law is addressed. It comes from the usual perspective of both fi nancial 
and accounting law that regulation is applicable to groups. This does not necessarily 
correspond with the logic of tax law, as discussed. 
From the viewpoint of both fi nancial and accounting law, it is normal that branches are 
included in the uniform treatment as dictated by domestic law. This is why in double bank 
levy conventions the taxation power rests with the state of origin even in case of branches, 
and it is only the residual taxation power that remains for the destination country. It also 
comes from this structure that it is the destination country (the host country) that will under 
treaty be obliged to give credit, and it is not domestic resident persons, but foreigners to 
whom foreign tax credit is offered. 
As it has been to date only the UK that has concluded bank levy treaties, and only with 
France and Germany, the following discussion is confi ned to these three jurisdictions. It is 
useful to see the legal sources both at national and international level. Table 2 is reproduced 
on them. 
13 Matheson, Th.: Financial Sector Taxation and the Ongoing Financial Crisis. Amsterdam 
Centre for Tax Law Conference, December 9, 2011. 
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Table 2: Current legal status 
UK France Germany 
Current status of 
legislation 
Legislation included in 
the UK Finance Bill 
published on March 31, 
2011 and due to pass 
into law in the summer 
of 2011, but legislation 
is effective from 
January 1, 2011. 
Enacted on December 
15, 2010 together with 
the Finance Act for 
2011. Effective as of 
January 1, 2011. 
Relevant legislation 
introducing the bank 
levy was resolved on 
December 9, 2010 and 
became effective on 
December 31, 2010. 
Notably, the German operating branches of foreign fi nancial enterprises may escape 
German taxation as they come from a country of the European Economic Arena (“EEA”), 
and due to the European passport, according to which they are not subject to bank licensing 
in Germany. As well, a UK subsidiary of a German bank falls out of the scope of German 
taxation because Germany applies a bank levy to single entities only. The German operating 
permanent establishment (“PE”) of a UK bank will certainly not be taxed in Germany. The 
reason for this is that the UK–Germany double bank levy convention explicitly provides 
for that. 
Interestingly, the levies are applied in the three jurisdictions under discussion precisely 
to address externalities. The fi nancial activity that seems to suggest less risks may be 
excluded from taxation, and progression in tax rates refers to dangers of expansion. It is 
also noteworthy that consolidation applies on the widest scale in the UK. France also 
applies its levy on consolidated entities, provided, however, that the head of group operates 
in France (as mentioned). Germany applies its levy on single entities. Notably, Germany 
does not give relief from double charging because the German levy does not deem to be a 
tax. This is not really logical because all the relevant counties concluding double bank levy 
conventions are aware of the bank levy that is different from normal taxes. 
In a case where a UK bank is owned by a UK non-bank, the UK regulations are not 
consistent with the rule of the UK–France treaty on the primary taxation power of the origin 
country. Accordingly, the UK renounces taxing the entities that are established in the UK. 
One can still argue that in a case where a UK bank is under the control of a UK non-bank, 
both the UK bank and the UK non-bank fall outside the scope of the logic of bank levy 
regulations. 
It is likely that in a case of mixed control, the respective double charging convention 
does not provide relief from double burden. The German subsidiary of a UK bank that is 
ultimately owned by a German bank may be subject to the German levy, being an entity 
ultimately owned by a German entity. However, the same entity may simultaneously be 
subject to the UK levy. This is because it is directly owned by a UK bank. Relief from 
double taxation may fail if the public authorities of both jurisdictions argue that the 
respective entity falls under their own authority. 
The double bank levy conventions as examined above, largely follow the structure of 
an income tax treaty, based on the OECD model. However, the allocation of taxation power 
is different from this, as discussed. The UK–Germany treaty has special rules, as already 
mentioned above. This is fi rst because Germany respects in its law on bank levy the single 
European system of licensing fi nancial enterprises, while the UK does not seem to do the 
same. Second, Germany applies its bank levy on single entities. This is why a subsidiary of 
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a German entity that has been established in the UK falls out of the scope of German 
regulation. Table 3 follows to illustrate what has been dealt with above. 
Table 3:  UK–Germany double bank levy convention, compared to the OECD model income 
tax convention 
UK–Germany convention on the avoidance of double charging of 
bank levies 
OECD model income tax 
treaty 
Art. 1 on banks as covered, possibly on a consolidated basis Art. 1 on the personal scope 
Art. 2 on bank levies, aimed at reducing systemic risk, as covered Art. 2 on the taxes covered 
Art. 3 on defi nitions Art. 3 on defi nitions 
Art. 4 on residence Art. 4 on residence 
Art. 5 on permanent establishments Art. 5 on permanent 
establishments 
Art. 6 on charging rights on permanent establishments: the primary 
taxation power rests with the state of residence, even on a consolidated 
basis 
Art. 7 on business profi t: the 
primary taxation power rests 
with the state of source 
UK–Germany convention on the avoidance of double charging of 
bank levies 
OECD model income tax 
treaty 
Art. 7 on the elimination of double charging: 
– the UK levy is credited against the German levy in respect of the 
German operating subsidiary of a UK parent in a banking group 
– the German operating PE of a UK bank is exempt from the German 
levy 
– the German levy is to be credited against the UK levy in respect of a 
UK operating subsidiary of a German parent in a banking group (under 
German national law, no German levy on the UK operating subsidiary 
of a German bank) 
– the German levy is credited against the UK levy in respect of a UK 
operating PE of a German bank 
Art. 23A and 23B on the 
elimination of double taxation 
–– Art. 24 on non-discrimination 
Art. 8 on MAP Art. 25 on MAP 
Art. 9 on the exchange of information Art. 26 on the exchange of 
information 
Double levy conventions are different from income tax treaties at three major points: 
– such a convention applies to levies that are usually calculated on a consolidated 
basis; 
– such a convention applies to levies that are aimed at reducing systemic risk; and 
– the primary power of taxation rests with the country of origin. 
Apparently, both the subjective and objective scope of a double levy convention is 
signifi cantly different from that of an income tax treaty. This is the basis, on which it can be 
explained why such a treaty is different from an income tax treaty as to the allocation of 
taxation rights as well. The latter is only the corollary of the former. Deviation from the 
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normal taxation standards can eventually be traced back to the function and character of a 
bank leverage tax that is fundamentally different from normal taxes. 
The externalities arise from the fi nancial crisis that appears globally. The various 
countries have largely remained to date to handle with it, however, at a national level. This 
makes also restriction on the cooperation with other states concerning the allocation of 
taxation power. This is why the allocation of taxation power is much more limited in case 
of double levy conventions than in case of income tax treaties. In the latter instance, the 
function of fund raising need not be associated with the function of addressing externalities. 
This is thus a situation that can be managed in a much easier way. 
3. Justifi cation issues
(i) Tax incidence 
Article 12 of the proposed FTT Directive provides for that no taxes can be introduced at a 
national level that would be compatible with the European-wide FTT. This is because a tax, 
being in competition with FTT, would disturb the smooth operation of the European FTT. It 
was also necessary to clarify the relationship with the consolidated EC Capital Duty 
Directive (08/7/EC)14 and the consolidated EC VAT Directive (06/112/EC).15 Namely, the 
VAT Directive also prohibits the introduction of domestic taxes that would be compatible 
with the harmonised value added tax. Similarly, the Capital Duty Directive does not allow 
to introduce domestically taxes on the issue of securities. Since the European FTT would be 
compatible at least with the Capital Duty Directive, it is necessary to provide for that the 
FTT Directive does not prejudice the existing provisions of the Capital Duty Directive. 
FTT concerns the trade in securities, including derivatives. The FTT Directive excludes 
from its scope among other things the daily transactions of lending and payment. Notably, 
Hungary has recently adopted a tax on the transactions of daily payments. In principle, it 
would not disturb the operation of FTT. Currently, BLT and securities transaction taxes 
have been in effect in some Member States. BLT would only be comparable to FTT if it 
were considered as a tax, the burden of which could be passed over. Since this is not 
precluded, BLT may be affected by the said Article 12, although this in not likely. However, 
it is diffi cult to predict what economic impact the simultaneous application of domestic 
BLT and the would-be European FTT would have. 
Knowingly, the basic options that are available for the taxation of the fi nancial sector 
are: FSC or BLT (steering duties), FCRF (a fee-based charge), FTT (Tobin tax), FAT 
(taxation of the value added), and claw back (ex post) measures. BLT and FTT certainly 
raise the problem of tax incidence. As one can hardly imagine that a steering duty applicable 
to the fi nancial sector would insulate private households and ordinary businesses from the 
impact on them of these taxes, the question of economic incidence cannot be avoided. The 
result should be at least that the new tax burden may mean higher borrowing costs and 
lower saving rates.16 
14 OJ L 46, 21.02.08, 11. 
15 OJ L 347, 11.12.06, 1. 
16 Vella, J.: The fi nancial transaction tax debate: Some questionable claims. Intereconomics, 
2012 (2), 90. 
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The problem of incidence does not only mean that taxes fall upon a wide group of 
market players, but also that taxation may be applied so widely that the various types of 
public charges may overlap with each other. In case of a fee, tax incidence is no problem. 
Even justifi cation is directly available if reference is made to a possible equivalence to be 
achieved between the liability of payment and the provision of public services. It is only a 
question here who would be the benefi ciary of these services. In case of FAT (e.g. in case of 
a profi t-based tax), the burden of tax, being of direct nature, surely cannot be passed over. 
So, it is easy to determine whom taxation falls upon. 
In case of BLT and FTT, it is an issue whether the burden of tax can be passed over. It 
is still not precluded either that the taxation power is simultaneously established on both the 
personal and territorial scope of taxation. This is not usual in case of taxes, the burden of 
which can be passed over. The result of the scope of taxation is that, upon the levy of tax, 
both unrestricted and restricted tax liabilities occur, connected to both the origin-based and 
destination-based scope of taxation. 
It can thus happen that worldwide taxation is introduced even in case of transactions. 
Not easily, but one can fi nd examples for this. See in this respect the taxation of gratuitous 
transfers (whether “inter vivos” or “mortis causa”). In many jurisdictions, property transfer 
taxes are established on worldwide taxation. For the taxation of transactions, it is yet normal 
that the scope of taxation is confi ned to the legally interpretable place where the taxable 
transaction is carried out. 
In case of BLT, it comes from the simultaneous presence of the possible pass over of 
the tax burden and the introduction of worldwide taxation that the broadening of the liability 
of tax payment is subject to particular justifi cation. It is in particular conspicuous how large 
the scope of the proposed European FTT is, although FTT is clearly a transaction-based tax. 
In case of BLT, it is not as much clear what is the subject of tax. It may vary, depending on 
whether the total balance sheet assets or liabilities are taxed, or what items will be excluded 
from the scope of taxation. It is furthermore not clear either whether the burden of tax could 
be really passed over. The widely designed scope of taxation may, however, lead to 
problems like double charging (taxing both on the foreign-operating branches of domestic 
enterprises and the domestic-operating branches of foreign-resident enterprises). 
It is a question, indeed, what is BLT levied on. Probably it is different from a 
transaction-based tax. It cannot be simply considered as a net wealth tax either even if the 
tax is levied on the total balance sheet assets (whether on a risk-weighted basis or not). 
Being levied on liability items, BLT is not far from turnover-based taxes. This way, it can 
be seen as approximate to transaction-based taxes. It is a further problem if FTT and BLT 
are applied in parallel to each other. This has been to date the practice in a few countries 
(see, e.g. the UK stamp duty and the French FTT in parallel to the UK and French bank 
levies, respectively). If overlapping in taxation cannot be excluded at a national level, it is 
even a more serious issue to meet the possible introduction of taxes at a European level. 
With FTT, it is a problem of tax incidence that the taxpayer position is determined in 
line with the fundamental Community freedoms, including not only the freedom to open a 
branch in another Member State, but also the freedom to supply services across the border. 
As a consequence, a party not locating in an FTT zone may be caught by taxation on the 
basis that he or she is a party to a transaction, the other party to which resides in an FTT 
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zone jurisdiction. Then, the fi rst party may be obliged to register for FTT purposes in the 
affected FTT-zone country, although he or she is not resident in that country.17 
With BLT, it is problematic for the purposes of tax incidence that consolidation applies. 
Consolidation cannot be avoided because the bank levy is introduced in line with the 
banking regulations on capital adequacy. Tax design is adjustable to the banking law 
framework that has already been made when bank levy is to be introduced. Financial law 
regulation does not make any sense unless it is based on consolidation. Consolidation is a 
challenge both for the company and tax lawyer, however, because the unit of regulation 
does not coincide longer with a legal entity. The entity subject to fi nancial law regulations 
is thus different from the entity subject to company or tax law provisions. As a result of 
consolidation, a foreign resident subsidiary is subject to taxation in the country where the 
head of group is resident. This is for tax purposes a situation that can hardly be managed 
unless a new concept of deeming rules is introduced. 
The French bank levy legislation seems to be logical in the instance that a non-French 
resident subsidiary only falls within the scope of French taxation if it belongs to a group, 
the head of which is resident in France. The UK does not apply such a distinction. However, 
in the UK, the scope of taxation is restricted in case of the UK-resident subsidiaries of 
foreign-resident parent companies insofar as the UK operating foreign subsidiaries do not 
fall within the UK taxation unless they belong to a UK banking group. In France or in 
Germany, there is no such restriction in effect. Consequently, once a subsidiary is established 
under the respective national law, it is automatically caught by the national bank levy. 
Notably, consolidation is obviously more digestible in the UK than in a continental 
jurisdiction both in positive and negative directions because it has been deeply integrated in 
the business and accounting practice as well. 
(ii) Handling market imperfections 
As discussed, the working papers of both the IMF and the European Commission can be 
criticised on the ground that they do not clearly depart themselves from the false 
presupposition that markets would tend to equilibrium and departure from it would be at 
random only. They do not utter either that fi nancial hyper activity is socially useless. The 
justifi cation of either FTT or BLT is to be established on the argument, however, that the 
externalities to be addressed by taxation are to be removed. These papers are thus not pleased 
with the only reference to the proper functioning of the internal market. They have been 
prepared, based on a shift in paradigm: the issue to be tackled is no longer what are the 
restrictions the Member States may apply on the proper functioning of the internal market. 
They focus instead on the externalities arising from the fi nancial crisis. They suggest that the 
internal market may cease to operate properly even for lack of distorting measures to be 
taken by Member States. In other words, market imperfections are implicitly recognised. 
This is the likely reason of the tax design with an extremely wide scope of taxation. 
From the angle of economic criticism, tax incidence does not seem to be a very serious 
issue. From such a perspective, the danger of relocation should not be exaggerated. This is 
because market participants would stick to the network facilities of the London and 
Frankfurt stock exchanges.18 It could thus be not easy for them to escape taxation. The 
17 Obouforibo, B. R.: A legal analysis of the proposed EU fi nancial transaction tax (manuscript). 
Amsterdam, 2012. 21. 
18 Schulmeister–Schratzenstaller–Picek: A General Financial Transaction Tax Motives. op. cit. 3. 
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cascade effect of tax could also be taken away, as long as FTT and BLT would not typically 
apply to a chain of value-added generating transactions. Instead, they would allegedly be 
applicable on a long line of bets to be independent from each other.19 
From a business perspective, the problems of the cascade effect or the allegedly low 
rate of taxation cannot be eliminated. Truly, a long line to bets can be identifi ed that are 
independent of each other. There are other structures in capital markets as well, however. 
Not to mention about mere speculation, there can be market players, like retail asset 
managers, pension funds or investment funds, whose transactions are integrated in the 
respective market segment. They are not in a position of avoiding getting engaged in a 
series of transactions. 
The rate of tax is a question again that can be studied from different angles. The tax 
rate can be compared not only to the notional value of the underlying transaction, but, e.g. 
to the sum of the option fee payable. Then, in particular if the fee payable is low, one can 
conclude that the effective tax rate is not–let us say–0.1%, but 3%, or even 20%, depending 
on a case.20 
One has also to tackle the problem of regression that is built in the application of FTT 
or BLT. The taxes that are applied to transactions or liabilities, being of objective nature, 
are not sensible to the ability-to-pay of single taxpayers. In particular, small investors do 
not prefer the introduction of these taxes at a signifi cant rate. This may also raise the 
problem of how to legitimise during a process of political decision-making the introduction 
of the new taxes in the fi nancial sector.21 Although it is reasonable to apply such taxes to 
address systemic risks relevant to the operation of the fi nancial sector, they would debilitate 
the redistributive function of taxation. This is clearly a particular constraint on the 
application of these taxes that must not be taken out of consideration. 
Financial regulation as an alternative to fi nancial taxation usually has progressive 
impact. For example, the introduction of bans on certain exposures would hit large investors 
much stronger than small ones. Regulation may thus be benefi cial for the purposes of the 
redistributive effect of fi scal policy.22 It may signifi cantly distort, however, the decision-
making of the major fi nancial service-providers. 
The primary instrument of addressing systemic risks is regulation. Corrective taxation 
plays a complementary role only in this respect. This is due to the measurement bias that is 
extremely high if taxation applies. Regulation is less subject to a problem of measuring 
toxic instruments.23 This does not mean that measurement bias would undermine the 
applicability of corrective taxes in the fi nancial sector. This means, however, that due to this 
problem the rationale for corrective taxes in the fi nancial sector is in this respect rather 
disputable. 
Apart from the above concerns, it is a major benefi t of taxation that, contrary to 
regulations, it does not mean direct interference with the decision-making of economic 
operators. This may enhance the normative nature of a legal policy. This is an advantage 
despite the problems of regression in taxation and the measurement bias. 
19 Op. cit. 5–6. 
20 Vella: op. cit. 92. 
21 Masciarando, D.–Passarelli, F.: The fi nancial transaction tax: A political economy view. 
Intereconomics, 2012 (2), 96. 
22 Op. cit. 97.
23 Op. cit. 98.
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(iii) Erosion of Community freedoms 
Fundamental Community freedoms are in the very heart of Community law. They constitute 
in fact tabu. Although they can be restricted, restriction can be only justifi ed by the rule of 
reason, and even in that case provided that restrictions are introduced in the public interest, 
and that the restrictive measures do not violate the principle on proportionality. Having 
experienced the global fi nancial crisis, the international agencies have started thinking over 
the tax policy options like FSC and BLT, and FTT. It is extremely diffi cult to introduce such 
taxes as they deem to be path-breaking measures in the sense that they cannot be justifi ed 
longer with the idea of free competition. 
Free competition is not suffi cient longer in justifying new policy measures, including 
tax measures. The idea of free competition, on which the whole system of Community law 
is established, has become dubious from the perspective of both economic and social 
rationality, and morality. The fi nancial crisis has thus entailed a crisis in legitimation. Once 
justifi cation of new measures cannot be traced back to the idea of free competition, it is not 
clear longer what can be the basis for justifi cation. No one wishes to forego the mechanisms 
of free trade, or the basic values of subsidiarity and private property. However, the 
introduction of fi nancial taxes cannot be explained by these ideas. In other words, they can 
hardly be introduced in a way that they are entirely consistent with the fundamental 
freedoms. They can be justifi ed, but not by the morality and inherent logic that come from 
the fundamental EC freedoms, and from the rationale of free competition that stands behind 
them. 
The introduction of fi nancial taxes may legitimately represent serious restrictions on 
the free movement of capital at least. The key issue of justifi cation is in this respect whether 
the taxes to be introduced in their specifi c form go beyond what is necessary, while seeking 
to achieve the objective of stopping fi nancial hyperactivity that may represent systemic 
risks on the whole economy of the Member States. Justifi cation is dubious because it cannot 
rely on the normal argumentation that approximation of the existing practices of the 
Member States is necessary for the purposes of the smooth operation of the internal market. 
There should be existing rules, at which approximation could be targeted. Such rules do not 
exist, however, in the fi eld of the taxation of the fi nancial sector. 
Article 113 TFEU is the basis for the approximation of the tax laws of Member States. 
Although it concerns indirect taxes, this does not mean that its scope is confi ned to a certain 
type of taxes. This is not only because it cannot eventually be clearly separated from each 
other the so-called indirect and direct taxes. It is more important that the operation of 
harmonised indirect taxes can be disturbed by any way of taxation. It is clear from the legal 
cases on the application of Article 33 of the Sixth VAT Directive that both direct and indirect 
taxes to be introduced at a Member State level are potentially suitable for disturbing the 
harmonised system of value added tax.24 
It is still another question whether the meaning of Article 113 TFEU could be expanded 
to include not only the restrictive practices of the past, but also future obstacles to trade 
resulting from the development of national laws, as the Commission argues be referring to 
C-58/08.25 It is problematic in particular that obstacles to trade do not arise in case of the 
24 Opinion of AG Chr. Stix-Hackl in C-475/03 Banca Popolare di Cremona, delivered on 14 
March 2006, Paras 50–61. 
25 Most often, “harmonisation” or “approximation” concerns existing national legislation. 
However, it is settled case-law of the Court of Justice that it can be used as a legal basis if the aim is 
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fi nancial taxes from the restrictive practices of Member States. Obstacles to trade have been 
generated by market imperfections. Article 113 is based on the assumption that there is 
perfection in the operation of markets. Distortion can be caused by the unilateral measures 
of the public authorities of Member States. This is clearly not the case concerning the 
innovated taxation of the fi nancial sector. Distortions do not arise from state intervention, 
but from the very nature of the operation of fi nancial markets. Member States are innocent 
in this respect. It would be naive to assume that the single European market remains to be 
free from imperfections when fi nancial markets are failed. Without the applicability of 
Article 113 to the proposed FTT, a legitimate basis for intervention seems to be lacking, 
however. This may be equally true for BLT. If the ideal of fundamental freedoms and 
internal market, an elbowroom for free competition, is dubious, Community law 
harmonisation must inadvertently be overhauled. 
(iv)  Constitutional background: looking for a balance in the allocation of privileges and 
immunities in a sphere of para fi scal charges 
The tax measures like FSC or FTT cannot be seen as common taxes. The function of raising 
funds is complemented by the function of addressing externalities. Tax and non-tax 
regulatory tools are in this respect closely connected with each other. Under the infl uence of 
fi nancial regulations, tax legislation is deteriorated. First, fi nancial law has to treat fi nancial 
conglomerates, that is, groups of legal entities, and even on a scale of the globalised 
economy. Tax law can also manage groups through fi scal consolidation.  The use of group 
relief cannot be taken for granted, however, and it is not extended, but in very few cases 
across the border. 
Further on, fi nancial regulations may be established on estimates, for example, in the 
fi eld of introducing capital adequacy requirements or in the risk management associated 
with large exposures. The subject of taxation cannot be approximated by estimates, 
however. Even if the calculation of taxable profi t is not strictly adjusted to single transactions 
(for example, where the profi t of groups is divided by formulae), or the undistributed profi t 
of controlled corporations is to be added to the parent’s tax base in certain conditions), the 
liability to pay tax is to be determined at a level of exactness that cannot be satisfi ed by 
estimates. Tax liability cannot be based, e.g. on the assessment of how much risky portfolio 
investments or fi nancial claims are. 
A further problem is that fi nancial regulations are to be fl exible, being adjusted even to 
abrupt changes. Tax law cannot withstand much fl exibility, however. It can be seen from the 
above that a bank levy–the product of fi nancial rather than tax law–is far from being laid in 
place in the tax law order. 
to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of 
national laws. The emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be 
designed to prevent them. See: Commission Staff Working Paper; Impact Assessment; Accompanying 
document to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of fi nancial transaction tax 
and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, Vol. 1, 28 September 2011, 23; C-58/08 Vodafone, O2, T-Mobile, 
Orange, ECR 2010, I-4999, Para. 69. 
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Truly, tax law is artifi cial in the sense that it is based on the notion of income or profi t. 
It is thus established on notions that have been artifi cially created by the legislator.26 In the 
reality of business, it is gross income (sales receipts) and costs that matter. Profi t, being of 
synthetic nature, is merely the result of the comparison of the formerly mentioned two 
factors of business activity. Net income serving as a subject of taxation is artifi cial as well 
insofar as, under the concept of personal income tax, it is not identical to the gains or losses 
that are to be derived or sustained upon a single transaction. Instead, income is a positive 
margin, arising from the accretion of wealth that can be measured between two points of 
time. Tax law cannot still dispense with a normative basis. Tax liability must rely on legal 
provisions that determine tax liability preliminarily. BLT obviously fails to meet such a 
requirement. In this sense, it cannot be considered as a tax. Instead, it can be seen as a sort 
of para fi scal charges, introduced by the public. 
In the current world of business, company and tax laws are losing their signifi cance 
in many aspects. The participants of capital markets do not require complicated, 
comprehensive, categorical and rigid company legislation. They prefer to get rid of the 
compulsory choice of company law forms. They accept at the same time that the economic 
type, or rather the mere size of business is becoming relevant for the purposes of legislation. 
Important players of capital markets prefer to hold simple legal forms like partnerships that 
are fi scally transparent. These simple entities are still able to mobilise huge amounts of 
capital. This phenomenon can be called as the crisis of “anima societatis”. The fate of tax 
law is similar. The exact determination of the taxable basis has been in many cases illusory. 
This is because the calculation of profi t has become uncertain. 
Para fi scal charges appear in an economic environment where manufacturing has been 
replaced by services, material goods have been losing their signifi cance in contrast to the 
intangible goods, and the individual evaluation of the single assets and liabilities has been 
replaced by the evaluation of the earnings capacity of the business that occupies a particular 
segment in the market. This means that the valuation of assets and liabilities depends all the 
more on the subjective factor of holding a position by the business under evaluation as a 
carrier of particular earning capacity in the market. 
As diffi culties arise in measuring cardinal goods, relational goods become important.27 
They are not subject longer to zero sum games like positional goods. Instead, the more they 
are shared, the more they are valuable. Due to the diffi culties in measuring cardinal goods, 
distributive justice cannot be easily administered. This problem is even exacerbated by the 
crisis of the institutional system of welfare states. Systemic values are all the more replaced 
by improvisational interventions. The externalities that are associated with the fi nancial 
crisis can hardly be put within the system of due process. Here, equality seems to be less 
important than to achieve a balance of the privileges and immunities that are allocated 
among market participants. As a corollary of the emerging privileges, public burden must 
also be borne increasingly. The more value fi nancial service-providers raise, the more 
responsibility they have to assume. The burden that is laid on them should even be adjusted 
from time to time, and some times subsequently, because they operate in a changing 
environment. 
26 For the use of legal fi ctions in the context of tax avoidance, see: Deák, D.: A proposal of law 
and ethics and its application to the case of tax avoidance. In: Ove, J.–Lars, J.–Tynes, P. (eds): 
Responsibility, deep ecology and the self: Festschrift in honour of Knut J. Forlag 1, Oslo, 2011. 81–82. 
27 Bruni, L.–Zamagni, S.: Civil economy; Effi ciency, equity, public happiness. Bern, 2007, 179. 
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(v) Global crisis, debt bias and bank levy 
Tax law does not seem to be satisfi ed with the application of certain accounting measures. 
The acceleration in time of the realisation of gains or losses with notional contracts, the 
synthetic treatment of composite transactions with swaps, the calculation of gains or losses, 
based on fair valuation rules, and the application of the off balance sheet items seem to 
challenge the normative framework that is indispensable in tax legislation. Consolidation 
that is quite normal when the subjective scope of tax is drafted suggests again departures 
from the transaction-based methods of calculating profi t or loss. The application of formulae 
upon the estimation of profi t isolates the calculation of both accounting and tax profi t from 
individual transactions. Instead, the gains or losses to be allocated among otherwise 
independent legal entities lack precision that has been normal to date in the sphere of 
accounting. 
Besides, the current accounting practice seems to be inappropriate to handle the 
problem of debt bias. As mentioned above, a number of accounting tools are able to serve 
fi nancial innovation without the possibility of signalling dangers. In particular, additional 
amounts of capital appear upon the restructuring of fi nancial claims that does not mean 
fresh capital in fi nancial terms, but in accounting records only. For example, new items of 
equity appear as a result of the exchange of shares. This is not new capital, however, that 
would have been raised by new investors. This is a change in the shape of investment only 
that suggests increase in capital, although the increase in capital is only the result of 
accounting operations. Similarly, the capital of the companies can be appreciated in line 
with accounting rules following mergers. It is not yet clear, however, how stable this 
appreciation will be, and how much the real economy can benefi t from the changes arising 
from the accounting settlement. Precisely these problems led to the reform of accounting 
practices, the starting point of which was the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. 
The function of tax law is different from that of accounting. Tax law is not designed to 
give a clear view of the company’s fi nancial position, although it is useful for tax purposes 
as well to get a clear picture of business. Tax legislation–as a means of fi scal policy–is still 
designed to refl ect the expectations of equity and legal certainty. These requirements may 
stop the management from carrying on activities that can otherwise be smoothly handled 
from an accounting point of view. Tax legislation–supporting the goals of economic 
stabilisation and distributive justice–suggests something extra, apart from accounting law. 
Tax law is still dependent on accounting operations due to the link between accounting 
and tax profi t (not to mention here how close this link can be in individual jurisdictions). 
Obviously, the tax legislator cannot isolate himself or herself from accounting manoeuvres. 
Although a business may be interested in presenting reduction in its assets and liabilities for 
tax purposes, it may act in a different way, while applying for new funds in the capital 
market. Tax and commercial accounting strategies may still overlap with each other in cases 
where improvement in the equity position is benefi cial both for tax purposes and before 
investors. This will lead us again to the problem of debt bias. 
Debt bias is a major reason for the distorting effect of taxation on business decisions. It 
has contributed to deepening the fi nancial crisis as well. Therefore, methods like CBIT and 
ACE are welcome. They can complement existing thin capitalisation rules. The point to the 
notion of CBIT is that interest and similar expenses cannot be deducted. The impact of ACE 
is that the cost of holding equity can be recognised for tax purposes, similar to that of 
holding debt capital. By means of CBIT, the tax base can be increased. By way of ACE, the 
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tax base is to be reduced. It is still common in the two measures that businesses may be 
discouraged from getting involved in fi nancial hyperactivity. 
A Tobin-like tax is also a means of discouraging businesses from getting engaged in 
fi nancial hyperactivity. A transaction tax that is subtly targeted at the transactions deemed to 
be associated with externalities may be even more effi cient than the income tax measures 
like CBIT or ACE. A bank leverage tax can also be effi cient in discouraging business from 
fi nancial hyperactivity. For example, there is progression in the rates of the German levy, 
depending on the type of risky liabilities. BLT is targeted in most jurisdictions at tainted 
business. In most countries that have introduced BLT, innocent assets or liabilities (long-
term deposits, safe investments, etc.) are excluded from taxation, as discussed. Taxation 
may also be heavier, depending on the size of business. 
It is a question whether income tax measures of CBIT or ACE and bank leverage taxes 
can be introduced simultaneously. Probably, this does not mean problems taken by itself 
since income tax measures are addressed to the asymmetry in the treatment of taxable 
income, and BLT or similar duties are in turn aimed at certain items of tainted assets or 
liabilities held by fi nancial service-providers. 
Richard Page acknowledges28 that BLT and a cost-of-equity tax deduction allowance 
would increase tax compliance costs, and would not generate a revenue fl ow that would 
signifi cantly contribute to alleviating the budgetary imbalance problems. Furthermore, a 
BLT would also raise horizontal equity problems. They would not generate a long list of 
drawbacks associated with transaction taxes, however, he argues. Interestingly, transaction 
taxes would 
– shift economic activity out of the jurisdiction, and generate deadweight losses; 
– increase investment costs; 
– decrease asset liquidity; and 
– undermine the confi dence in democracy by further incentivising the use of tax 
avoidance mechanisms that are not available to ordinary people. 
Contrary to fi nancial transaction taxes, BLT and ACE do not seem to be in a great need 
of being globally harmonised. Overlapping of taxation and asymmetries cannot be avoided, 
however, in case of BLT or ACE either. This is true, even if they do not hit taxpayers so 
directly as the case is with any contracting party providing services across the border that 
are subject to FTT. 
FAT is another option of levying tax on the fi nancial sector. In Denmark and in France, 
there are special payroll taxes as well. They are levied on the payroll of bank employees in 
proportion to the VAT exempt activity of the fi nancial enterprise. The function of these 
taxes is to substitute for VAT that is not applicable to fi nancial activity. The substitutes may 
suggest restrictions on the activity of fi nancial enterprises. They also seem to avoid falling 
in the policy trap of transaction taxes. They are still not specifi c enough to meet fi nancial 
hyperactivity. The problem of debt bias is not covered by FAT either. 
28 Page, R. T.: Foolish Revenge or Shrewd Regulation? Financial-Industry Tax Law Reforms 
Proposed in the Wake of the Financial Crisis. Tulane Law Review, 85 (2010–2011), 213–214. 
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(vi)  Double charging in conditions of emerging harmonised banking law 
and fragmented tax law 
Conditions for international cooperation are irritated if taxes are levied on a consolidated 
basis. Overlapping of the sovereign taxation powers can only be mitigated when those 
subsidiaries of foreign enterprises do not fall within the scope of domestic taxation that do 
not belong to a domestic group (like in the UK). Even in that case, the origin country is not 
willing to renounce levying taxes on the foreign operating branches and subsidiaries. This 
is because the legislative responsibility is concentrated both in the area of tax and non-tax 
regulatory tools in the country where the entities (or rather the groups) are established. As a 
consequence, the taxation power cannot be allocated to the destination country. This is a 
tendency that is not consistent with what is happening in the sphere of consumption taxes 
or income taxes. Even if international bank levy agreements can be concluded on the 
avoidance of double charging, the destination country does not gain access to signifi cant 
taxation power. 
In the world of taxation, territoriality is guiding to the division of taxation powers. 
This is a tendency that is being superseded by the regulation of banks. The latter is a sphere 
where it is becoming acceptable that it is the responsibility of the country, in which the 
particular fi nancial enterprise is established, and home country jurisdiction is in many 
aspects accepted in host countries. In the EU, we have had the single licensing system of 
banks since decades. In the global arena, the Basle standards also suggest the approximation 
of home country jurisdictions. Tax law has not yet been ripe for this. However, being 
introduced in line with banking regulations, BLT corresponds to the logic of banking law 
both in domestic and cross-border cases. Bank levies cannot thus be put smoothly in the 
national tax system either in case of domestic or treaty law. 
Banking law suggests challenges for the tax legislator. In particular, it would be 
reasonable to take over the single licensing system that would be applicable to fi nancial 
intermediaries that operate in the European capital markets across the border as the 
withholding agents of the payment and information of tax. Foreign resident intermediaries 
should be allowed to act as paying agents in the Member State of the client, resident in a 
Member State, different from that of the intermediary. Then, the intermediary would not be 
obliged to employ local agents, in order to deliver to the local tax authorities information 
and to provide the payment of tax. Although such a proposal seems to be logical, the real 
life is far from being consistent with it. What remains in practice is fragmentation. This not 
only makes business more expensive, and more risky, but such fragmentation could not be 
upheld in the circumstances of a global fi nancial crisis either. 
4. Major conclusions 
(i) Refl exivity in law to substitute for legal certainty 
The viewpoints of the business, and the lawyer, on the one hand, and that of the militant 
representatives of macroeconomics seem to be in irreconcilable confl ict with each other. It 
may be quite persuasive to break with the tabu of free trade from the viewpoint of 
macroeconomic criticism. Such a break would mean signifi cant interference with business 
decisions, however, that may endanger the smooth operation of fi nancial markets. Out-of-
market intervention may also cause the problem that the normative basis for taxation is 
debilitated. Arguably, the antinomy experienced between the views of business and 
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macroeconomics could be resolved on a case by case basis, provided that the refl exivity of 
law opens up opportunities for the parties involved in individual cases to fi nd agreements 
with each other. The chances of parties may still depend on the evolving macroeconomic 
environment. 
As bank leverage taxes, and similar para fi scal charges are designed not only to raise 
funds, but also to address externalities, they are not able to provide such a level of legal 
certainty as the law on normal taxes. As bank levies, and similar para fi scal charges may be 
subject to adjustment by way of “ex post” measures, they cannot be explained, based on the 
traditional principles of equality and legal certainty. Instead, they rely on the refl exivity of 
law. It comes from there that contracting out seems to be appropriate to replace the equality 
before the law, and the consistency and coherence of legal and non-legal values to be 
developed during a course of discourse may be ready to substitute for legal certainty. 
(ii) Seeking to handle the problem of debt bias by bank leverage taxation 
FTT is attacked in particular because of constituting obstacles to liquidity and because of 
the danger of relocation. These problems can be avoided by BLT (or FAT) that can be viable 
in particular if introduced simultaneously with some of the cost-of-equity deduction 
methods to be enforced in income tax law. The combined effect of this can be to mitigate 
debt bias. A bank levy is superior to a transaction tax insofar as, being levied on balance 
sheet items rather than on transactions, it does not directly lead to the increase in the cost of 
fi nance. Financial service-providers are given a leeway to be economic with the burden of 
tax. In contrast, being subject to a transaction tax, they do not have any option, but to shift 
it to customers. 
(iii) Faded legislative ideal of a market with fundamentally freedoms 
Financial taxes represent innovation in tax law. In the context of taxation and fi nancial 
regulation, tax law is to be approximated to banking law. From a European perspective, it is 
problematic that banking law is much more harmonised than tax law. Tax law is still 
expected to keep pace with banking law. For the time being, European bank law, based on 
the single licensing system, and tax law, fragmented and broken into the separate 
jurisdictions of the Member States, are in glaring contrast to each other. 
It is another diffi culty that harmonisation should be based on the approximation of the 
existing rules of Member States. In the evolving area of fi nancial taxes, such rules have not 
yet been developed, however. Furthermore, the hard core of European harmonisation is the 
smooth operation of the internal market that is based on free competition. The point to bank 
levies and other para fi scal charges applicable to the fi nancial sector is, however, that they 
are designed precisely to encroach upon free competition that has produced imperfections 
in fi nancial markets. 
Arguably, fi nancial taxes are to be aimed at removing the obstacles to the future trade 
in securities. Then, restoration of fi nancial markets can be hoped. Free competition cannot 
serve as an ideal to be reached by legislation, however, insofar as market imperfections are 
reproduced and, therefore, fi nancial markets cannot survive without the interference with 
them by out-of-economic means even in the future.
